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STATE OF FEAR: BRITAIN'S 'COMPENSATION CULTURE' REVIEWED. 
Kevin Williams* 
Reader in Law, Sheffield Hallam University. 
Assertions that Britain is (or is in danger of becoming) a 'blame and sue' society are 
nowadays so frequently repeated in the media and elsewhere that they have all but 
become received wisdom. Whether they express a dangerous reality or a passing 
moral panic deserves serious consideration because of their potential to influence 
legislative and judicial agendas. This article examines what is meant by the phrase 
'compensation culture', evaluates the recent evidence concerning it, and attempts to 
assess whether the concerns expressed are justified. 
 
Introduction 
Claims that Britain is in the grip of a ‘compensation culture’ and, consequently, a 
‘litigation crisis’ are asserted with increased frequency.1  Concerns of this kind can be 
found in the columns of newspapers, in official reports, political discourse, legislative 
debate, and judicial decisions. Thus, in 2004, the former Trade and Transport 
minister, Stephen Byers, complained about the adverse effects of 'excessive 
litigiousness' on both the economy and the national psyche,2 while David Davis, 
shadow Home Secretary, gave an undertaking that a Conservative government, if 
elected, would cut out ‘the cancer of litigation’.3 And at much the same time as a 
Private Member's bill designed to protect volunteers from negligence liability was 
being lost,4 it was judicially asserted that the ‘pursuit of an unrestrained culture of 
blame and compensation has many evil consequences'.5 Yet, as a government 
commissioned report pointed out in 2003, there is usually ‘very little analysis of what 
this term [compensation culture] means, let alone proof that such a “culture” exists’.6 
This article reviews some of the recent evidence.  
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Is there a problem? 
The answer to this question is hotly disputed, depending as it does on what exactly is 
thought to constitute the ‘problem’, as well as on who is asked. The growth of a 
‘compensation culture’ implies an increased and unreasonable willingness to seek 
legal redress when things go wrong,7 whilst ‘litigation crisis’ implies that this shift in 
social attitudes has been translated into undesirable (perhaps unbearable) levels of 
formal disputing. As we shall see, anecdotal and other evidence of varying quality can 
be found to support or deny these assertions.  
 
It seems there may be a number of different problems. Frequently it appears that there 
are too many (successful) claims, at other times that compensation payouts are too 
costly, quite commonly that lawyers' fees are excessive: sometimes a mixture of all of 
these. What sorts of claims should count for the purposes of discussion is also 
disputed. In some versions, litigation risks associated with certain commercial 
activities are regarded as constituting part of the ‘problem’. Thus, auditors and 
company directors have recently pressed government for special legislative 
protection, essentially on the basis that in an era of increasingly complex transactions 
and potential catastrophe risks, unlimited personal liability is too onerous and a 
deterrent to (efficient) market participation.8 Other candidates for inclusion are claims 
before employment tribunals, largely on the basis of their number,9 and family law 
disputes because they consume the largest slice of the civil legal aid budget.10 
 
In 2002, a report by the Institute of Actuaries concluded that there is a growing 
compensation culture, estimating the total cost of claims at about £10 billion a year or 
1 per cent of GDP.11 This is a very large sum of money, of course, though it 
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represents a wide variety of claims, as well as their associated administrative costs 
and expenses.12 Moreover, gauging the significance of the Actuaries’ headline figure 
is difficult unless we have some idea what other countries spend.  
 
In 2004, the government’s Better Regulation Task Force (the 'Task Force'), drawing 
on an international review of the cost of just tort claims published two years earlier, 
listed the UK’s expenditure (at 0.6% of GDP) as lower than that of ten other 
industrialised nations, including Canada (0.8%), Australia (1.1%), Germany (1.3%) 
and the USA (1.9%): only Denmark spent less.13 The Task Force report, which 
government has since largely accepted,14 denied that Britain is in the grip of a 
compensation culture, basing itself partly on the opinion of 'almost everyone' who 
gave evidence to the enquiry and partly on the declining number of personal injury 
claims registered in recent years.15 In any event, the Task Force saw the problem as 
lying elsewhere than in the statistical facts. The 'real' problem was said to be 
perceptual. Allegedly, too many of us have been persuaded by media stories and the 
avaricious advertising of certain claims management companies that 'large sums of 
money are easily accessible'.16 According to the Task Force, there is no objectively 
sound basis for such beliefs or for asserting that Britain is suffering from a 'have a go 
culture'. Nonetheless, their report paradoxically concluded that an 'urban myth' 
asserting its existence has been widely accepted as the reality which, in turn, has 
inclined an unquantified minority to press speculative claims that lack merit or are 
spurious.17 These conclusions about changing attitudes to blame and responsibility 
chime nicely with the findings in some (methodologically doubtful) opinion polls.18  
Arguably more significant is the failure of the report to supply any hard evidence to 
support its conclusions. A related strand in commonly expressed opinion (seemingly 
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shared by the Task Force) is to the effect that the mere fear of excessive litigation 
induces undue caution resulting in adverse social consequences. These range from the 
potentially serious, such as defensive medical practices19 and schools denying pupils 
opportunities to engage in outdoor pursuits,20 to the cancellation of a downhill cheese-
rolling competition.21  
 
The number of personal injury claims. 
The Task Force concentrated on personal injury litigation because it 'attracts most 
attention from the media...and was raised most frequently in our stakeholder 
meetings'.22 This certainly is the conventional locus of most disquiet about the growth 
of a 'compensation culture'.  
 
If we similarly confine our attention to personal injury claims, how is the size of this 
problem to be calculated? That partly depends on which data sets are consulted. Given 
that legal aid for personal injury actions virtually disappeared in April 2000, the 
figures published by the Legal Services Commission are of very limited help.23 
Similarly, the Judicial Statistics are an uncertain guide to how much ‘blaming and 
claiming’ is really going on here. First, because they count only those claims that 
result in the issue of proceedings, which may be fewer than one third of cases 24 and, 
second, because they fail fully to identify how many proceedings across the country 
are for personal injury damages.25  Despite these limitations, the most recent Judicial 
Statistics provide little support for the notion that accident litigation is booming out of 
control.  
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The Task Force relied on statistics from the Compensation Recovery Unit (CRU) 
showing the total number of newly registered accident claims as having fallen by 
some ten per cent to around 557,000 in 2003/4 compared with the preceding two 
years.26  Seemingly, the CRU retains only such data as relates to the last three years, 
so obscuring longer term trends, which is unfortunate. 
 
 Market analysts, Datamonitor, provide an alternative source of information. Their 
figures show no consistent trend in the number of injury claims, as distinct from their 
cost, which all agree has been increasing. Numbers and types of claims fluctuate from 
year to year. Thus, whilst there was a 7.4 per cent fall to 689,000 claims in 2001/2, in 
the year following the number of personal injury claims made to insurers increased 
slightly by some 2.6 per cent due to an increase in industrial disease claims, which 
offset a fall in accident claims.27 
  
So the statistical evidence is both incomplete and somewhat equivocal, counting as it 
does different things across different timescales.28 And, of course, even if we could 
establish with certainty how many claims there are, that would not tell us how many 
claims is too many. It often seems to be assumed, implicitly at least, that any increase 
is a cause for concern whilst a fall is to be applauded. This broadly seems to be the 
position of the Task Force, although they enter an important caveat. The phrase 
‘compensation culture’, they say, is a ‘pejorative term’ which unfairly suggests that 
all ‘those who seek to “blame and claim” should be criticised’. This is a position they 
rightly reject on the basis that in civilised communities the victims of provable 
injustice or wrongfully caused injury should be in a position to seek effective 
redress.29  
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There are two other considerations connected with the numbers issue.  First, claimant  
lawyers often point out with considerable (if self-interested) justification that the great 
majority of injured persons never resort to the law: that it is precisely the absence of a 
compensation culture that characterises our liability system. In this regard, it appears 
that not much has changed overall since the time of the Pearson Royal Commission 
almost thirty years ago.30 However, the picture is mixed. Certain sorts of claims are 
much more likely to be brought nowadays. Thus, the claim frequency rate by those 
injured in road traffic accidents has increased significantly.31 In contrast, while 
actions for clinical negligence are no longer the rarity they were thirty years ago, the 
proportion of negligently damaged patients who do claim continues to be very small - 
maybe fewer than one in fifty.32 Accordingly, it is not entirely clear that it should be a 
source of satisfaction that only Denmark spends less than the United Kingdom 
relative to GDP when compensating injured tort victims.33  It may be that too many 
wrongful harms in some areas go uncompensated or that compensation levels are low, 
comparatively speaking.34  
 
A second point is whether legitimate, well-founded claims should be counted as part 
of the 'problem'. After all, one reason why 'compensation crisis' stories find such 
ready audiences seems to be related to the ways in which they reflect public anxieties 
about the decline of social and moral values, such as self-reliance and personal 
responsibility; anxieties that are represented here by tales of greedy lawyers egging on 
grasping claimants chasing compensation for trivial harms which in an earlier era 
would have been stoically shouldered without public complaint. Accordingly, any 
attempt to test for the existence of a ‘crisis’ should, arguably, look beyond the 
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absolute numbers of injury claims to whether there has been an increase in those that 
are substantially without merit or are bought off simply for their nuisance value. 
Unfortunately, there is no direct or reliable evidence to answer to this crucial question 
either.35  Nor is it easy to find a suitable proxy measure. For example, a 1998 study of 
legally aided personal injury cases reported a success rate of 63 per cent overall with 
more than 80 per cent of road traffic claimants recovering damages.36 This appears to 
suggest that the great majority of injury claims are well-founded and genuine. 
However, since all the cases in the sample must have passed the Legal Aid Board's 
'merits' test in order to have qualified for public funding in the first place, no such 
assumption can safely be made. The subsequent disappearance of legal aid effectively 
means that the economic imperative enshrined in 'no win-no fee' deals (alongside the 
'loser-pays' costs rule) must nowadays do duty as the gatekeeper against frivolous 
litigation. As we shall see, lawyers are unlikely to want to act for clients unless their 
chances of success are good.37  
 
Disparate Impact or Increased Cost? 
Even if there is no new flood of personal injury claims overall and no convincing 
evidence of a growing number of frivolous ones either, there may be legitimate cause 
for concern if particular sorts of defendants appear to be fielding more than their ‘fair’ 
share or if the costs of litigation or settlement are rising sharply. 
  
The NHS is commonly said to be facing this combination of difficulties to a marked 
extent. In a relatively short space of time there have been very dramatic increases in 
both the number of claims for clinical negligence and their cost.38  Reducing litigation 
expenditure permeates the government’s current liability reform proposals, which is 
 8 
to be expected at a time when spending on the NHS and its efficiency are high on the 
agenda of all the major political parties.39 Insurers warn that there are other pockets of 
concern elsewhere in the liability system, for example, the projected cost of future 
asbestos-related claims.40 Furthermore, as the next section notes, there are 'novel' 
forms of liability that have at least the potential to destabilise some public sector 
budgets, such as education and social services, who cannot easily pass on these costs, 
except to taxpayers of one sort or another. 
 
The increasing cost of settling even standard, run-of-the-mill injury claims is an 
anxiety the public and private sectors (and their insurers) share, the greater flexibility 
of private sector organisations to distribute these losses notwithstanding. For example, 
one source calculates that the value of motor injury claims has been rising 
consistently by almost 10 per cent a year, while public and employers' liability claims 
have shown sometimes larger, if more erratic, increases.41 Explanations are readily to 
hand for the strong upward pressure on damages awards. On top of the inevitable 
effects of inflation on earnings and prices, the way that compensation for death and 
injury is calculated is now more favourable to claimants than formerly. In Wells v 
Wells, the House of Lords decided that damages for future pecuniary losses 
(consisting principally of loss of earnings and care costs) should be based on the 
likely rate of return available if the award was invested in index-linked government 
securities rather than the stock market.42 The effect of this change to the ‘discount 
rate’, particularly in the case of serious injury, has been to increase significantly the 
lump sums awarded in order to offset the expected lower levels of investment return.43 
In a separate development, the Court of Appeal in 2000 decided that the conventional 
sums awarded in respect of non-pecuniary losses (such as pain and suffering and loss 
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of amenity) were too low. In consequence, this element of awards to the most 
seriously injured has increased by approximately a third with proportionately smaller 
increases for the less seriously hurt.44 This combination of judicially-inspired 
increases, together with certain statutory changes,45 has undoubtedly contributed to 
pushing up the size of settlements and awards and, consequently, the cost of liability 
insurance, though not in a directly linear manner.  
 
Higher premiums burden those called upon to pay them and should properly concern 
the legal system also, which has operated for more than a hundred years on the largely 
unspoken assumption that the principal categories of defendants are able to insure 
themselves. Thus Morgan, for example, is plausibly able to say that liability insurance 
is 'the only thing keeping the tort system viable'.46 In 2003, sensitive to misgivings 
expressed by some business lobbies about the affordability of liability (especially 
employers' liability) insurance, the government instituted separate enquiries by the 
Office of Fair Trading and the Department for Work and Pensions. 47 These reports 
confirm that the cost of employers' liability cover, in particular, has risen steeply over 
a relatively short period of time. Accounting for this outcome is less than 
straightforward, though it appears to have much more to do with insurers belatedly 
attempting to rectify accumulated losses caused by poor underwriting or investment 
decisions and historically unrealistic pricing policies, rather than to rises in the cost or 
number of injury claims. Either way, fortunately, we are nowhere near the point 
where mainstream liability insurance is unavailable or prohibitively expensive.48  
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The 'real' problem and some of its causes. 
The idea that defendants are beset by ever increasing numbers of doubtful claims is 
not proven. Indeed, the 'problem' we started with seems to have come down to this; 
that whatever may be the actual likelihood of irresponsible litigation, many believe 
themselves to be at heightened risk of being unfairly sued. According to the Task 
Force, this critical misperception or 'urban myth' induces socially and economically 
damaging risk-averse behaviour. Reputedly, organisations become less innovative, 
scarce resources that would be better applied elsewhere are unproductively diverted, 
unnecessarily costly safety precautions are taken, sometimes beneficial activities are 
fearfully abandoned altogether.49 It is worth adding that in low trust organisations 
operating an internal 'blame culture' there is evidence that staff are less likely to report 
adverse events, while the accuracy of such reports as are made is likely to be 
questionable. For such organisations, one unfortunate consequence is that they have 
fewer opportunities to learn from their mistakes.50  
 
Rather than trying to establish the extent of this allegedly fateful misunderstanding or 
document its precise effects, a difficult task at the best of times,51 the recent analyses 
instead seek to identify external causes to explain what looks like a collective loss of 
nerve on the part of potential defendants. Effectively they say that whilst some 
liability stories may be media exaggerations or even apocryphal, business and the 
public sector have been put on the defensive by the introduction of conditional fee 
agreements (CFAs) and the aggressive tactics of some claims management companies 
and solicitors' practices. Notwithstanding that Claims Direct and The Accident Group, 
the initial market leaders, went into liquidation in 2003, the Task Force assert that 
'people are still being encouraged to "have a go" by the more unethical claims 
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management companies'.52 If so, they too should soon go out of business since low 
chances of success mean low rates of fee recovery and unaffordable after-the-event 
insurance.53 The precise effect of CFAs on the frequency of claims is presently 
uncertain, though economic logic suggests that their tendency should be to increase 
claim rates. What research has shown is that some 93 per cent of cases taken on a 'no 
win-no fee' basis are successful, 54 which implies two things. First, that only strong 
cases are likely to be taken up which, while hardly surprising from the perspective of 
claimant lawyers,55 falls well short of confirming the claim sometimes made by 
politicians that the replacement of legal aid by conditional fees has made justice 
accessible to all.56  Second, that the problem of 'have a go' vexatious litigants, which 
the Task Force claims to have identified, is likely to be correspondingly small. Even 
so, external regulation over how an estimated 350 firms of 'claims farmers' advertise 
and provide their services to the public seems advisable and likely,57 despite the 
failure of the 2004 Clementi review of legal services to recommend specific 
controls.58 Regulation may go some way to reassuring those who fear they are 
vulnerable at-risk defendants.  
 
While some potential explanations for the number of claims, such as changes in 
accident rates,59 are not much explored by either the Task Force or the Actuaries, both 
reports make anxious reference to an expanding liability regime. Echoing Stapleton a 
decade earlier,60 the Task Force say that new types of claims 'that were simply not 
considered by lawyers 20 or 30 years ago are now being pursued'61 - the implication 
being that the judiciary must take the blame to the extent that novel claims are 
admitted. Of course, quite how expansions of tortious liability affect (insured) 
defendants or society more broadly is both uncertain and disputed.62 The OFT report 
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in 2003, while it thought the picture rather mixed, concluded that the scope of the 
liability rules have less influence on insurance prices than other factors such as the 
size of awards (which have increased), access to the legal system, and the propensity 
to claim.63 My sense is that both sides are right. No doubt the great bulk of claims will 
continue to be based on conventional legal principles applied to perfectly ordinary 
road traffic and workplace injury cases. On the other hand, the psychological impact 
of new, especially uncertain, liabilities on defendants (and on their insurers' 
underwriting and pricing policies) may be marked, even where the development in 
question initially appears to advantage relatively few claimants. In fact, some recent 
judicial decisions have the potential to affect large numbers (albeit we can only guess 
how many) and destabilise some (particularly public sector) budgets. Among other 
candidates for inclusion here are the new rules on educational neglect,64 suspected 
child abuse,65 work-related stress,66 sports and activity injuries,67 vicarious liability,68 
damages for psychiatric injury,69 and the patchy relaxations to the doctrine of 
causation.70  
 
Most of these developments have been prompted by judicial assessments of what 
justice to claimants requires, however unsettling they may be for defendants. This is 
not to say that courts are unconcerned with the potentially adverse effects which an 
expanded liability regime might have or how that may be received by the public. Over 
the years, the senior judiciary, in particular, have shown themselves alert to the 
dangers of overkill and floodgates, despite the difficulties in gauging their extent or 
effect. In practice, judges commonly find themselves having to fall back on intuition 
and commonsense as regards the likely wider impact of their decisions since our 
bilateral adversarial system is not designed to facilitate informed judgments based on 
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empirical evidence, even where this is available, which all too frequently it is not. 
Nevertheless, in the post-Human Rights Act era there has been a marked reluctance to 
rely on unproven policy fears as a basis for striking out apparently novel duty 
claims.71 Conversely, there have been occasions on which courts have plainly wanted 
to send a forceful message to potential claimants and the legal profession. Thus in 
Gorringe v Calderdale MBC, Lord Steyn warned that 'the courts must not contribute 
to the creation of a society bent on litigation, which is premised on the illusion that 
that for every misfortune there is a remedy'.72 Another example is Tomlinson v 
Congleton BC in which the importance of individual responsibility was strongly 
emphasised when denying recovery to a ‘foolhardy’ adult trespasser injured diving 
into a lake.73 The Task Force rightly, if somewhat naively, welcomes this as 
indicating that 'the tide may be turning' and as demonstrating that the occupiers of 
public recreational spaces 'are not expected to take extreme steps to avoid accidents'.74 
  
What should be done? 
The purpose of this paper has been to review the evidence concerning the existence of 
a 'compensation culture'. It has not been to evaluate the likely efficacy of the 
numerous and diverse suggested responses, except to say that we should be careful to 
avoid introducing solutions to non-existent or different problems. In this regard, both 
the Task Force and the Actuaries reports take a wrong turn to the extent that they 
focus on the supposed motivations of some injured claimants, attributing to them 
greater greed or other moral failings as the source of the problem.75 It has been 
persuasively argued that in the United States, the usual exemplar of a compensation 
culture out of control, individuals are no more inherently prone to sue than the 
citizens in other developed societies, and that what has mattered is the extent to which 
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American social and legal structures have actively encouraged resort to law as a 
primary means of resolving every sort of dispute by creating rights to sue, lowering 
barriers to litigation or increasing its rewards.76 
  
There are some structural changes that can and almost certainly should be undertaken 
here, such as controlling the activities of claims management companies and the way 
lawyers charge. Furthermore, whilst it is almost certainly too late to turn back the 
clock to an era when there were fewer lawyers, who were prevented from having a 
direct pecuniary interest in the outcome of their clients' cases, that should not be a bar 
to regulating how and where legal services are advertised today.77 More careful risk 
and experience-rating by underwriters will make insurance bite more effectively and 
ought to contribute to reducing accident rates.78 Improving rehabilitation opportunities 
for accident victims would be beneficial to them and should reduce compensation 
costs, perhaps by as much as a third ultimately.79  Encouraging defendants to resist 
doubtful claims as being the cheaper long run strategy seems sensible, though so long 
as insurers dominate the settlement process exhortation addressed to insureds alone 
may not work.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
In some quarters, the number of injury claims has been made to appear as a yardstick 
to measure the moral (and economic) condition of the country. Are we less tolerant 
and more litigious? Unfortunately, the available data do not provide a conveniently 
consistent answer, though on balance it looks as if the British continue to be a nation 
of 'lumpers' rather than litigators. There is good evidence that some sorts of accident 
claims have risen (from a relatively low base) and that the overall costs of personal 
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injury settlements have gone up. But there is virtually no reliable evidence about the 
number of bogus or exaggerated claims or whether they constitute a grave (or 
increasing) problem. What has been plausibly suggested is that 'some insurance 
industry commentators rely heavily on anecdotal evidence of a worsening 
environment in order to justify price increases, quoting individual cases of highly 
doubtful or speculative claims that cannot be truly representative of claims in 
general'.80  When Lord Levene, the Chairman of Lloyd's of London, complains that a 
'deluge' of claims is 'plundering the economy',81 we sense that this may not be a totally 
disinterested assessment. 
  
The Task Force analysis seems to be that if we are suffering from a crisis, it is largely 
one of confidence arising from the misplaced fears of potential defendants and their 
insurers, rather than from a culture that 'blames and claims' too much. In contrast, in 
spring 2005 while on the election stump the Prime Minister declared that many public 
servants (particularly teachers and healthcare workers) were worried that they may 'be 
subject to unfair legal action' and that ways must be found to 'protect' them from what 
Mr. Blair called a 'real problem',82 which serves to remind us that the liability issue, 
being about the distribution of resources, is broadly political.83 Recently, Harlow  
expressed particular concern about the incidence of claims made against state actors 
accused of various sorts of regulatory failure, as well as surprise at the 'culpable' lack 
of attention paid by policy-makers to the associated compensation issues given their 
likely impact on public resources and budgets. 'Tort law', she suggests, 'urgently 
needs a political steer and legislative input'.84 This happened in Australia in 2002,85 
and is shortly to be provided in this country by a government bill.86 When evaluating 
the bill's provisions, the scope and reliability of the evidence will (or at least ought to) 
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be critical. Loose talk of a 'compensation culture'  no doubt helps to sell the very sorts 
of newspapers that purport to despise it most: however, we should be cautious before 
we allow it to dictate the legislative (or judicial) policy-making agenda. 
                                                          
* Thanks are due to the journal's anonymous referees for their helpful comments on an earlier draft. 
The usual disclaimer applies. 
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